By Kamal Shah
News articles speculating the acquisition (or not), of the Predator armed drones by the Indian Government for use across the services have been finding their way on and off. More now, with the reported focus on indigenous development and manufacturing, as well as the “prohibitive cost” involved. Atma Nirbharta is a noble step and one in the right direction; however one would need to tread cautiously in these testing times (the ongoing Ukraine crisis and the perpetual looming China threat), unless we want the Indian defence forces ending up in a situation where its surveillance and targeting capabilities are severely disadvantaged.
Domain awareness in all three domains, air, sea and land, is a precursor for successful military operations. Provisioning of real-time information of enemy positions to own forces on the ground or sea and also to the planning staff at shore-based headquarters would aid all the three Services in suitably responding to emerging threats.
Considering the security scenario and length of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Line of Control (LoC) and International Boundary Line (IBL) along India’s land borders as well as the range of Choke Points of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Ombai & Wetar, Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), there is a vital need for an Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platform with long endurance and range to undertake active intervention and targeting with precision weapons at standoff ranges. We could say here that the preferred choices nowadays are Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) due to their flexibility, greater range of movement, and access to traditionally hard-to-reach areas, suitability for hazardous missions in contested airspace, and also cost considerations.
The need for surveillance is more critically felt in the maritime area, where almost no satellite surveillance capability exists in-depth. The present capacity is highly inadequate to monitor deployments of maritime assets (ships and submarines) of potential adversaries in the vast expanse of the IOR. In order to take advantage of India’s unique Geographical location, one needs to have sufficient long-range surveillance assets that can continuously monitor the strategic choke points and the International Shipping Lanes for providing early warning of vessels of interest. This will also act as a credible deterrence for enemy submarines sitting at our doorstep and other platforms of interest entering through chokepoints undetected.
The HALE RPAS, like the American MQ-9B, with an endurance of above 30 hours, along with the capability of ‘Battlespace Transparency’ (Army/Air Force lexicon) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA – A Naval lexicon) through sharing of real-time information of enemy positions and delivery of smart standoff bombs, anti-tank missiles and anti-ship missiles, would be a game-changer in safeguarding the territorial integrity and protecting maritime interests of India. HALE RPAS, with higher endurance and advanced payloads for Communications intelligence (COMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), besides other advanced functions, are capable of undertaking persistent surveillance at extended ranges and strategic chokepoints. Areas around LAC/LOC also have dense electronic environments leading to spoofing and jamming of the platforms. Communications Security (COMSEC) enabled MQ-9B is designed to operate in a dense Electronic Warfare (EW) environment.
Along with the offer for the state-of-the-art platform, General Atomics has reportedly proposed the setting up a Maintenance and Repair facility in India and technological collaboration with Indian partners for Research and Development. It is understood that the entire Maintenance and Repair work would be carried out in India through Indian vendors and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) only. Such a collaboration with a global technological leader will definitely empower Indian DPSUs, startups, local aero defence industries and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) to become part of the global supply chain and a hub for maintenance and repair of HALE RPAS. This would, in turn, create jobs and revenue in India in the long run. This would be the push we need towards high-end indigenisation.
Currently, no indigenous capability is available in India to manufacture HALE RPAS. Therefore, continuing with the procurement of MQ9B HALE RPAS by the three Services would be the prudent option. The technology transfer would help in bridging technological gaps, and the Indian industry could leverage the procurement for the Design and Development of its own Indigenous HALE RPAs, thus meeting the future requirements of the services. It will also help develop an ecosystem for drones through Sea Guardian Global Sustainment Support and setting up of Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul facilities in India.
If India plays its cards well, it could emerge as a Maintenance and Repair hub for the entire region and friendly foreign countries in adjacent regions that acquire similar capabilities.
Comparison Between MQ9B & Other Options
A comparison between the MQ9B Predator and other such RPAS on offer in the international market reveals the larger endurance, operational flexibility, superior equipment and ability to perform in an electronically hostile environment of the MQ9B. Further, its ASW capability would prove to be of immense value to the Navy, as also its extended range that would enable its deployment at distant choke points such as Sunda Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
If we compare the MQ9B with other projects being progressed like the Heron TP or the indigenous RUSTOM/ TAPAS, it is evident that the capabilities of the latter are distinctly lesser. Whether it be the endurance, capabilities of sensor payload, flexibility to divert, the capability of operating from an airfield different from the parent base, operating in a GPS denied environment, airspace integration features, anti-submarine capabilities, etc, MQ9B is a class apart, and there is a huge jump in the capability at a fraction of the cost. It is pertinent to mention that the TAPAS is not weaponised, unlike the MQ9B HALE RPA.
Can the requirement of Services cannot be met through Heron Mk I (which is being upgraded)? It is important to note that Heron MK1 is MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) category RPA. Because of its size and weight, MALE is an entirely different category of RPA and, with much lesser range, endurance, payload carrying capacity, and altitude ceiling, is primarily for tactical employment. With all these limitations, the Heron Mk1 definitely cannot meet the requirement of surveillance off the choke points/straits in the IOR or the heights in the Northern/ Eastern sectors or operational areas at extended ranges more than 1500 km.
So why is HALE required when the Armed Forces (particularly the Indian Navy) are also procuring fixed-wing surveillance aircraft like the P8i? The obvious answer is that they perform different roles and are two different categories of platforms. RPAS like MQ9B are primarily for ISTAR with limited attack capability, whereas P8i is capable of more complex missions like ASW and is also capable of delivering much more ordnance on target. While hunting down submarines (conventional or nuclear), P8I plays a dominant role in the kill chain, and it is the only platform even seasoned submariners are wary of. Availability of HALE would enable P8i to undertake dedicated ASW missions in a conflict situation while allowing HALE to carry out MR.
The services have been spearheading the governmen’s Make in India initiative, but a homegrown HALE solution is anticipated to take considerable time. While the delivery timelines offered by the established OEM, having all facilities available, is between 4-6 years, manufacturing in India will take considerably more time. Being MTCR Cat 1 equipment with niche technology, manufacturing in India would be limited to basic low-end manufacturing. Given these conditions, the three Services would be compromising their capabilities to execute the fundamental roles of continued surveillance (and targeting) across the vast land borders and the expanse of the Indian Ocean for a reasonably long period. Gains, when weighed against the operational requirement, would not be justified.
