General Bikram Singh (r)
Wars have been fought not just between sovereign states but even between states and non state actors. While non-state actors have waged asymmetric wars in the current century essentially for ideological, religious, social and economic reasons, States have gone to war to protect, promote and pursue their national interests, which are identified based on the needs, aspirations and concerns of the state. The realist thinkers have classified national interests into two categories – the vital and secondary. Safeguarding of vital interests is critical for ensuring the state’s security, its independence and for the protection of its institutions and core values besides the economic wellbeing of its people. These interests are nonnegotiable and represent issues over which the state is prepared to expend blood and exercise hard military power options. Secondary interests are important but not critical to the state’s well-being and can be dealt with through negotiations and other non kinetic means.
Considering the human and economic costs of war, decisions for going to war should pass the criteria of just war – legitimate authority, just cause, right Intention, likelihood of success, proportionality and last resort. These have been lucidly explained in the book ‘Moral Constraints on War’ edited by Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion. Informed decisions taken in the backdrop of just war principles are politically, legally and morally correct and invariably have the national backing, which is critical for bolstering and sustaining soldiers’ morale. Two major wars of this century that can be singled out for undermining the just war rationale are – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) launched by President George W. Bush in 2003 and the recent unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by President Vladimir Putin. Both invasions will be remembered for the irrational decision making that levied humongous economic and human costs on both sides. While attending the US army War College class of 2003-2004 along with over 300 American officers, I was privy to the sentiments of most officers. They did not subscribe to the justification being given by their President and felt OIF was an avoidable war. OIF has now been publicly condemned by the American people and even Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has whipped up outrage and antiwar protests in Russia. Barring few countries, the international community too has condemned Russian aggression.
The blatant disregard to the just war criteria could be attributed, inter alia, to ‘Hubris Syndrome’. Leaders suffering from such personality disorder tend to display reckless behavior and are impervious to rational perspectives. Intoxicated by power, such leaders become arrogant, demonstrate impetuosity, ignore details, shun advice and as such, make rash decisions. Most tend to display ineptitude towards foreign policy and driven by the greed for power and self-glorification; fail to comprehend the second and third order implications of going to war. As brought out by David Owen and Jonathan Davidson in their paper titled – ‘Hubris syndrome: An acquired personality disorder? A study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years’, President Bush demonstrated hubristic traits. Recently, Professor Ian Robertson, a neuropsychologist at Trinity College Dublin, has opined that Putin too could be suffering from hubris syndrome. Studies also show that leaders, who remain in office for too long, tend to develop hubristic traits. The United Nations, despite having lost much of its prerogative as a global governance body, would do well to monitor such leaders on the globe and institute measures to forestall any of their evil designs.
History of warfare highlights that conflicts have also been engineered and fuelled by major arms manufacturing states to expand their markets. The modus operandi entails selling arms to one of the two belligerent states, which goads the other to look for similar weapon systems, if not better. This initiates arms race wherein, the economic benefits override the ethical concerns for human safety. Open source information reveals that between 2002 and 2018, the US sold aircrafts, helicopters, combat vehicles, warships, small arms, ammunition and artillery weapons to 168 nations at an estimated cost of $560 billion. This phenomenon is unstoppable and will continue to grow as the three major arms manufacturers are the US, Russia and China and a regulated arms sale helps them shape the geostrategic arena for the furtherance of their economic and geopolitical objectives.
In war, the military power is applied in four stages – engage and/or deter, seizing initiative, decisive operations and the transition. In the first stage, the opposing sides continue to engage each other on the diplomatic and economic fronts but concurrently, resort to aggressive posturing and employ non kinetic means. In fact, this phase encompasses the grey zone operations with hybrid warfare operational art and tactics. The activities are kept well below the threshold that could compel the adversary to exercise a large scale hard power option. Cyber capabilities and information operations are the tools optimally employed to strike at the minds of the adversary’s political and military leadership, shape perceptions, public opinion and cause disruptions. This stage could take years and even decades. Two examples are the US-Iran imbroglio and US – China posturing in the south and east China seas. In the Indian context, we are in this stage with both Pakistan and China. Since the latter part of the 20th century, the most significant change in the character of war has been the ‘hybridization of conflict’, which requires a far more integrated application of all elements of national power. Sanctions are also applied to punish the aggressor or adversary. Though essentially economic in nature, they could also include a broad array of penalties on the diplomatic and social fronts.
In the second stage, in addition to the activities of the first stage, kinetic means are employed to seize initiative to attain battle space operational superiority. The use of kinetic means for shock and awe effects is regulated to afford opportunity to the defender to accept defeat and prevent further destruction. The initial blow, which leverages surprise for optimal effects, is supplemented in the third stage in a seamless manner by the decisive operations to force the enemy into submission. In view of the development and expansion of built up areas, future wars will necessitate proficiency in urban warfighting. The fourth stage of transition entails management of the captured areas or pulling out based on the outcome of the negotiations. However, if negotiations fail, it requires creating adaptable mechanisms that would facilitate governance of the occupied areas. Washington has a very poor record in this regard. Their posthaste pullout from Iraq and Afghanistan left numerous vulnerabilities, which were exploited by inimical elements.
Although wars will continue to be waged for political ends, the means and concepts for the application of military power will remain dynamic and evolve based on new technologies, capabilities of potential adversaries and other environmental realities including the impact of climate change. Technology superiority will be a decisive factor in shaping the battlespace and winning future wars. The focus of technology development will remain towards creating robust command and control structures for integrated multi-domain operations in the nuclear backdrop, shortening of OODA loop, enhancing mobility, transparency and all weather capability, achieving surprise and deception, augmenting firepower and precision engagement capability with extended ranges, providing imaginative tools for information operations and cyber warfare. Militaries the world over are also investing heavily in artificial intelligence (AI). Some of the AI tools being developed are autonomous weapons systems, AI enabled drones and AI powered killer robots. Technology will continue to give rise to warfighting strategies, operational art and tactics that facilitate attaining military objectives through non contact warfare.
To thrive and obtain competitive advantage in volatile, uncertain and complex battlefield environments where the character of war is constantly changing, leaders at the tactical, operational and strategic levels will have to be mentally agile, tech savvy and empowered with cognitive aptitude for critical, creative and innovative thinking. They will have to think holistically about various factors that help shape the battle space and ensure comprehensive risk management for sustaining high tempo of operations. Since the economic and human costs will reduce the duration of wars, future leaders will have to possess suitable frames of reference for accomplishing assigned missions in compressed timeframes and with minimum costs.
