By Ravi Srivastava
Since the first Gulf War in the 1990s, air campaigns have held a special place in military strategy, as the U.S. showcased its stealth and satellite-based tracking and communication capabilities. Now, three decades later, air campaigns are again being confidently executed in urban areas. This shift relies on strong intelligence, surprise, speed, advanced weaponry, and, most importantly, a high-risk appetite.
The continuing air campaign of Israel with some devastating impact in Lebanon has drawn major attention across the world. The most qualifying aspect of this demonstration of Air Power has been its employment in the dense neighbourhood and suburbs of the capital Beirut and the results it has fetched for Israel. It’s an acknowledgment from none less than Hezbollah itself. Which accepted losing its senior ranks in these air campaigns. In around a month, Hezbollah acknowledged having lost seven senior functionaries including its secretary-general, Hasan Nasrallah in the Israeli Air Force bombing.
The news was received by much surprise across the world capitals as it claimed to have eliminated one of the most dreaded elements in the ongoing conflict, in what appeared, a rather too simple an operation. A fighter aircraft took off from Israel and dropped a few bombs over a suspected building getting one of their most wanted. Was it that easy? Not really. On the contrary, it demonstrates one of the most sophisticated employments of Air Power in an active conflict zone with surprisingly successful outcomes.
Multiple Options
When planning for military operations as complicated as targeting Hezbollah leadership right in the middle of a built-up area, there must have been many options placed on board for the Israeli war cabinet. Such as a missile strike, limited ground operations, operations by special forces, or even covert operations. However, the selection of the means to reach the end makes the operation highly consequential. Each of the other options was fraught with high failure risks. Any ground operation was not only highly anticipated by Hezbollah but the intelligence cover it was enjoying has ensured that close access remains extremely difficult if not entirely improbable. Besides the loss of surprise moment ground operation breaks out.
The possibility of a missile strike was a No Go as any missile however accurate, carries an inherent possibility of error and is mostly considered an area weapon. Employing it in dense neighbourhoods would have been catastrophic with a very low guarantee of hitting the intended structure. Operations by Special Forces in a built-up area have very limited chances of success. Special forces ride on the element of surprise which is almost impossible to ensure in a scenario like Beirut suburbs. This made the Air Operation more relevant as it had the element of surprise, high accuracy and high TNT content. The availability of strong intelligence was a factor that made the Israeli leadership convince its Western partners to a go-ahead by offering assurance of little collateral damage.
Risk Appetite
Plans are one thing, but their successful execution is quite another. Air campaigns have been seen to gain the special attention of militaries since the first Gulf War in the 1990s. This was the first time when Americans showcased their stealth and satellite-based tracking & communication capabilities. Three decades later we are again in a moment of revelation of witnessing Air Campaigns being confidently carried out in the built-up areas. This transformation of conflict philosophy has certain fundamental aspects: strong intel, maintenance of surprise, speed of operation, sophisticated weapons and high-risk appetite. The last one is the most monumental, as the rest of the factors remain mechanical input.
Militarily speaking, the capacity of Israel to undertake high-risk operations has offered them high dividends this time. The transformation of conflict management now seems to have graduated to returns being preferred over military conventions. It shows the risk of failure is being countered by adopting a high-risk approach, making severe loss or collateral damage acceptable. The legacy hesitancy is being shrugged off in favour of audacious and intel-driven operations. The question comes, – is this approach sustainable? Answers are not easy to come by but what can be reasonably assumed is that the Israeli template is very difficult to replicate.
The sustained air campaigns in the Middle East from multiple stakeholders including Israel, Iran, Houthis and Hezbollah have been startling. It’s not been a conflict as usual, the prolonged absence of ground operations in many cases has been the differentiating factor. This indicates an unwillingness to ‘physical’ involvement while trying to inflict the damage from a rather safe distance. Houthis are employing the missile to overcome their inability to mount ground operations, while Iran has fired hundreds of missiles to somehow respond to what it says, is a “bloodthirsty criminal entity”. This new approach is reflective of the availability of technology which was hitherto a domain of expertise for major military powers and the astonishing proliferation of them even to the non-state actors.
Valuable Pointers
The air campaigns as manifesting in the Middle East or Ukraine, do have some valuable pointers for the IAF, a formidable Air Force by any count. Firstly, Target Intelligence- there are multiple means of modern-day surveillance resources including drones and satellites which are a common practice. However, specific targeting requires real-time ground intelligence to prevent collateral damage and the confidence to hit even deep inside built-up areas. Secondly, The Capacity- the machine that is being operated and the payload it carries are an inseparable combination for any mission. When Israeli Air Force F-15I successfully took out Hezbollah Headquarters and dug 60 feet underground it dropped some 80 bombs including US-supplied 2000-pound bunker bursting bombs. IAF would have to factor in the availability and operational capacity to employ such kind of weaponry if it already doesn’t have. Thirdly, Partnerships – going all indigenous is most preferred but mastering critical technology and information is a graduated approach and its learning curve takes time to manifest. Even Americans had to borrow civilian bandwidth to adequately operate their military communication during the Gulf War, Israelis operate a plethora of American weapons and technologies and in the Ukraine war, foreign-made platforms have been known to be operated by mighty Russians.
Identification of critical requirements and going full steam for plugging such gaps through partnerships would massively augment IAF’s existing capacity. It would act as a strong enabler and a force multiplier along with the potent resources of this premier force. Drawing lessons from important conflicts is a known military practice for honing own skills and the IAF must be observing the developments very closely. But it’s also a fact that the difference in geography and operational dynamics makes the ongoing conflict a matter of little practical interest for IAF. The challenges faced by the force are entirely different and the IAF would be aiming to be exercised as a potent and preferred option in all future conflict scenarios!
Ravi Srivastava has varied experience in the security paradigm and is a keen follower of global geopolitics. His work has been regularly featured in national publications.
