By Vaibhav Agrawal
With the government gearing towards ‘Make In India’ and ‘Make For World’, will age-old procurement delays prevail? Experts tell IA&D in this exclusive report.
A top defence ministry official said that India did not differentiate between foreign and domestic firms, in the previous month, but it will “possibly” not import any defence item in the future. This was followed by a landmark policy by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, releasing the country’s third positive indigenisation list on 7 April 2022, setting yet another foundation for ‘atamanirbharta’ in defence. While the Indian Army seems to be getting a shot in the arm, can it conquer its age-old nemesis ‘procurement delays’ as the nation marches toward complete indigenisation?
It is estimated that 93 modernisation projects of the Indian Army are in progress at various stages in the procurement process. Over the past four years, about 121 capital procurement contracts have been inked by the army, and the standoff with China has boosted the modernisation process on an upward trajectory. Adding on to these developments, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Larson & Toubro (L&T) have teamed up for a lightweight tank based on the K9 Vajra 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, which is being designed to counter the Chinese Type-15 tank and operate at high-altitude terrains.
Hurdles In The Pathway
One of the significant challenges faced by the Indian forces is years of delays and budget negotiations that have threatened these upgrades’ success. For instance, there have been several delays while working with the Russians where the Indian Army was trying to replace its ageing INSAS rifle with the AK-203.
As a part of a joint venture (JV) with Russia, the Indian Army’s requirement for assault rifles was to be fulfilled with around 6.71 lakh AK-203 rifles. However, media reports claim that a delay was faced by the Make In India project.
Meanwhile, Indian forces got themselves equipped with large numbers of the US SIG 716 instead, with India placing orders for around 1.5 lakh of them. As per media reports, cost negotiations stood as one of the main reasons for the delay.
Joseph P Chacko, author of ‘Foxtrot to Arihant: The Story of Indian Navy’s Submarine Arm’ & ‘Warring Navies – India and Pakistan’ had this to say: “The replacement for INSAS was not conceived well in advance. India could have started two or three projects with different teams and approaches to create alternatives. We had to go with foreign equipment yet again. It was ok if we had failed, but we never tried.”
Major General Brajesh Kumar (r) told IA&D: “Certain amount of delay is inevitable when you do not manufacture your own requirements of armaments/munition systems. It takes time to build one’s capabilities as a tech-military ecosystem has a long gestation period. Possibly our priorities in the past may have contributed. Mercifully, things appear to be changing for the better.”
Long-Pending Procurements
Including the Ak-203 assault rifles, there are four long-pending procurements for which negotiations have been going on for years, troubled by cost issues and the transfer of technology for local manufacturers.
Apart from the Ak-203 rifles, these procurements include Russian Ka-226T ‘Hoodlum’ light utility helicopters (LUH) for the Indian Army and the IAF and heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for the Indian Navy’s six licence-built Kalvari (Scorpene)-class diesel-electric attack (SSK) submarines.
In 2014, the projected Ka-226T deal was initiated, and the India-Russia Helicopters (IRHL) JV was constituted, but over the past few years, differences have emerged that have threatened the Ka-226T programme imminently. These include the quantum of technology Russia was willing to transfer to the IRHL and the other being its overall cost.
Both the Ak-203s and the Ka-226Ts stood as the ‘need of the hour’ for filling operational voids which are presently being managed either through innovation or emergency imports, at a time when the Indian forces face challenges on its disputed northern frontier.
The CQB Carbine Attempt
Aimed at replacing the Indian Army’s 9 mm 1A1/2 carbines, the Indian Army’s carbine saga has been in the pipeline since 2008. Attempts have been made by the Indian Army to acquire CQB carbines, while another request for information for over 93,895 such carbines was issued by them in the previous year, five months after a tender for an equal number of weapon systems from Caracal International of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was scrapped by the Indian MoD. For nearly three decades, the army has been waiting for the 5.56×45 mm carbines.
The Indian Army’s counter-insurgency operations against militants in the north have been adversely impacted due to the lack of a close quarter battle carbine. In places like Kashmir, these shorter barrelled weapons can be effectively used in restricted space and close-quarter search-and-destroy situations.
Keeping the ongoing India-China standoff in view, a lack of close quarter battle carbines is also experienced by the Indian Army units deployed along the disputed LAC in eastern Ladakh. They are now employing assault rifles as a substitute, but this needs to be taken into consideration that, unlike assault rifles, carbines have a lesser ricochet when used in confined spots.
Can Current Alternatives Pave The Way In The Long Run?
India has witnessed several delays in necessary defence procurements, when asked about the implications of this, Maj Gen. Harsha Kakar (r) told IA&D, “There are sufficient reserves at every level to cater for emergency replacements. War wastage reserves are also held. The supply of some may resume shortly, while for others, there could be alternative sources of supply, including indigenisation. The final resort is always cannibalisation, but it may not be needed. A concern, yes, but not very worrying.”
Joseph P Chacko, further presented his views by saying: “There are always emergency purchases that can be exercised to address delays in procurement. Procedures are ok as it tries to eliminate wrongdoing or buying unsuitable equipment. It, unfortunately, takes time. With modern technology, some of these procedures can be speeded up.”
Can India Further Wait For ‘Indigenous Equipment’?
In view of the ground realities, Maj Gen. Rajan Kochhar (r) explained that India has waited long enough to develop indigenous defence equipment. According to him, indigenisation requires political will, budgets and improved work culture and ethics and is time-consuming. Transfer of Technology (ToT) will be a big issue, as also the availability of raw materials conforming to stringent quality control standards.
Maj Gen. Harsha Kakar (r) presented a contrarian point of view, “It will take time for indigenisation to be fully effective. We are moving towards it but need to be patient. In some cases, it could be fast; in some, slow. Depends on the levels of technology needed.”
India’s military capability needs to be developed within the available financial resources as delays, and innumerable deadlines have presented barriers to the upgrades and the modernisation of the defence services.
